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ABSTRACT
Outsourcing and subcontracting of manufacturing is growing at an incredible pace. According to a
November 1998 Dataquest survey, the Electronics Manufacturing Services (EMS) industry is forecast to grow
at a compound annual rate of over 26%. The largest and best known of the EMS providers, Solectron of
Milpitas California, has recorded an astonishing compound annual growth rate of more than 53% since 1992
according to Chief Financial Officer Susan Wang.
Despite the growing use of contract manufacturers, the decision to use them remains, in many organizations,
a tactical one. Decisions to outsource are often undertaken solely within the manufacturing organizations
within these firms, and focus primarily on reducing capital expenditures and direct costs such as labor. These
decisions rarely take into account the much broader strategic implications of outsourcing a portion of the
firm's production.
This paper examines outsourcing decisions and their financial, organizational and, most importantly, strategic
effects on the organization. It presents an integrated approach to making outsourcing decisions, a set of
quantitative tools for assessing outsourcing options, and guidelines for implementation and management of
the outsourcing relationship. The goal of the thesis is to enhance the overall quality of manufacturing
outsourcing relationships by ensuring coherence with overall company strategy and strong execution.
The work in this paper is based on a six-month internship as part of MIT's Leaders for Manufacturing
Program in the Consumer Products Division of Qualcomm, Incorporated in San Diego, California. The
learning presented in this paper is based upon observations made during the Qualcomm internship and an in-
depth review of the literature on outsourcing. Because the work was done for Qualcomm, the findings of
this paper are best suited to outsourcing decisions in similar organizations, those producing high volume,
high-tech consumer products. However, many, if not all, of the underlying concepts are applicable to
outsourcing decisions across a broad range of industries.
Thesis Advisors:
Alvin W. Drake, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
MIT Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Sara L. Beckman, Visiting Professor of Management,
MIT Sloan School of Management
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 PROJECT SETTING
The work presented in this paper was completed as a part of a six-month internship in Qualcomm's
Consumer Products Manufacturing Division in San Diego, CA. This internship is a result of a partnership
between Qualcomm and the Leaders for Manufacturing program at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
The primary goals of the project were to:
= Develop an operational model of how outsourcing cellular handsets should be conducted. This
model essentially describes how information and materials must flow between Qualcomm and its
subcontractors.
= Develop a financial model to provide some understanding of the economic value and costs of
outsourcing in terms of inventory, lead times and flexibility. In addition, it was necessary to
develop a method for understanding the volatility of both the inputs to this model and the final
outputs of the model.
= Use these models along with other knowledge to prescribe simple metrics that are highly
correlated with positive financial and operational goals.
1.2 CHAPTER PREVIEWS
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
Chapter 2 presents background information on Qualcomm in general and its Consumer Products division in
particular. This chapter provides a roadmap of the material and information flows necessary to design and
manufacture a wireless Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) handset.
CHAPTER 3: THE OUTSOURCING DECISION
Chapter 3 presents an in-depth survey of the issues surrounding an outsourcing decision. This chapter looks
at the implications of a decision to outsource manufacturing from financial, operational and strategic
perspectives.
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CHAPTER 4: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO OUTSOURCING
Chapter 4 presents an approach to developing outsourcing relationships that integrates many of the issues
presented in Chapter 3. This approach takes the development of the outsourcing relationship from making
the decision completely through to ending the relationship. In addition, this approach integrates the use of
the quantitative models presented in Appendix A: Outsourcing Cost Model.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 5 presents the overall conclusions to be drawn from this work.
APPENDIX A: OUTSOURCING COST MODEL
This appendix presents the Excel-based outsourcing cost model. It describes the inputs, the outputs, and the
assumptions surrounding the model. Most importantly, this appendix will describe how this model is
intended to be used and how it can be adapted for use by others.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
2.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter presents a brief overview of Qualcomm's strategy in the consumer wireless products area and
the current situation of Qualcomm's business. The company background information presented is by no
means a complete overview of all of Qualcomm's business. Instead, the overview focuses only on those
factors that in some way affect the outsourcing decision or execution. This chapter also provides some
background information on the flows of materials and information that are required to manufacture Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) handsets. The reader will find that much of what is presented is not
exclusive to CDMA handsets.
2.2 COMPANY BACKGROUND, POSITION, AND OUTLOOK
Qualcomm is a company that designs and manufactures telecommunications equipment based on its CDMA
technology. Qualcomm's primary business focus is to seed and grow markets for CDMA-based technologies
thereby ensuring a steady stream of licensing royalty payments well into the future. In the market for wireless
digital phones, Qualcomm's mission is to establish CDMA as the world standard for digital wireless
communication. To accomplish this Qualcomm created three different lines of business: Qualcomm
Consumer Technologies Division or QCT is responsible for designing and producing CDMA chipsets and
system software for mobile handsets and cellular base stations. Qualcomm Wireless Infrastructure Business
or QWIB is responsible for designing and producing CDMA-based digital wireless base stations. And finally
Qualcomm Consumer Products or QCP is responsible for designing and producing CDMA-based digital
wireless handsets.
Just prior to the start of this internship, in March 1999, Qualcomm settled a long-standing dispute and lawsuit
with Ericsson, a Swedish maker of wireless equipment and competitor, over intellectual property rights
associated with CDMA technology. Settling this dispute cemented CDMA as the front-runner to become the
world standard for third generation (3G) digital wireless systems. As a part of the deal, Ericsson acquired the
infrastructure business, QWIB, from Qualcomm. Shortly after the announcement of this deal, Qualcomm's
stock price rocketed by over 400%. It was now clear to the markets and to the wireless world that
Qualcomm had been successful in its strategy to make CDMA the world standard.
This settlement also made many ask how long it would be before Qualcomm also sold its other two divisions,
QCT and QCP, and became primarily an intellectual property company. For QCT, it was not obvious that
Qualcomm would benefit through a sale. After all, QCT had a solid and growing market position and was
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profitable. However, QCP was a different story. Although, QCP's volume had grown dramatically over the
past year, it was still at a severe scale disadvantage to its leading competitors: Nokia, Ericsson and Motorola.
Nokia, for example, produced nearly eight times as many phones per month as QCP. Much of this
discrepancy can be explained by the fact that QCP, because of Qualcomm's mission to promote CDMA as a
superior technology, only made CDMA handsets while its competitors made TDMA, GSM and analog
phones as well as CDMA phones. While CDMA was rapidly gaining acceptance and growing its share very
rapidly, these other technologies still provided a scale advantage to Qualcomm's competitors.
To combat this scale disadvantage, Qualcomm entered into a joint venture with Sony to form Qualcomm
Personal Electronics (QPE). QPE was structured as a separate corporation owned jointly by Sony and
Qualcomm. QPE was responsible for all handset manufacturing for QCP and all North American handset
manufacturing for Sony. While QPE did allow Qualcomm to leverage Sony's buyer power to offset some of
the scale advantages of its competitors, the relationship eventually became strained with each side attempting
to keep customer lists and production information secret from the other. This unique relationship also had
the downside of creating redundancy and information barriers between the design group in QCP and the
manufacturing group in QPE. Finally, in August 1999, Sony made the decision to withdraw from the North
American CDMA market. While Sony ceased to be an active member in the joint venture, many of the
organizational barriers that the joint venture created between QPE and Qualcomm design and development
remained.
All of this factored, either directly or indirectly, into the decisions surrounding outsourcing handset
production within QCP. The market for CDMA handsets was growing incredibly fast, but due to uncertainty
as to whether Qualcomm would remain in this business, restrictions were placed on new capital expenditures
within QCP. In May 1999, QCP began production in Guadalajara Mexico and Milpitas California with
Solectron, Inc., a leading electronics contract manufacturer. Initially only the circuit card assemblies (CCAs)
were produced in both Milpitas and Guadalajara. However, later that year, QCP ceased CCA production in
Milpitas and concentrated all outsourced production of CCAs in Guadalajara. During the same period, QCP
manufacturing added phone assembly and test capacity in Guadalajara. By September of 1999, Solectron in
Guadalajara was producing both CCAs and nearly completed handset assemblies and shipping them back to
QPE in San Diego where they were completed, packaged and shipped to customers.
Shortly after this, much of the outsourcing activity was put on hold when, in October 1999, Qualcomm
announced that it planned to sell QCP and was looking for a buyer. In December 1999, Qualcomm
announced a deal to sell QCP to Kyocera, a Japanese manufacturer of CDMA handsets.
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2.3 CDMA HANDSET MANUFACTURING MATERIAL FLOW
2.3.1 PRODUCTION FLOW
The production flow for handsets consists of three main steps: surface mount or circuit card assembly (CCA)
production, assembly and system test. Often, these two are referred to as only two stages: SMT, for the
surface mount technology used in this step, and FAT which is short for final assembly and test.
The SMT stage is by far the more
automated of the two. The inputs to
the SMT stage are primarily purchased
components such as raw circuit cards,
the radio chipsets, connectors and other
discreet components such as resistors
and capacitors. These components are
loaded into placement machines that
place the components in solder paste
on the raw cards. The populated cards
are then heated in a reflow oven to melt
the solder. The outputs of this stage
are completed CCAs. These are essentially
each side of the card.
Figure 1: Handset Production F/ow
the raw circuit cards with all components properly soldered onto
The SMT stage is far and away the most critical for system performance and the most costly if things go
wrong. As nearly 90% of the cost of the product is component costs and these CCAs are very difficult and
expensive to rework, a misstep here will certainly produce very expensive failures downstream in the process.
In addition, given the high frequency RF nature of the products being manufactured, a small process change
could have an enormous effect on the performance of the transceiver. For example, a small increase in solder
thickness could detrimentally affect the capacitance of crucial nets on the CCA and move the radio
performance out of specification.
The completed CCAs are then passed into the final assembly and test (FAT) stage of production. In this
stage, the CCAs are tested and calibrated at the board level. If necessary, they are reworked and then retested.
After this, the CCAs are assembled into handsets with plastics, antennae, keypads and liquid crystal displays
(LCDs). The assembled handsets are then tested at the phone level. During these phone-level tests the
phone actually makes a call and undergoes a simulated hand-off between base stations. The test equipment at
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this stage is all very customized. Not only is it custom to Qualcomm manufacturing, but it often has custom
fixtures and custom test software for each different product family. Once tested, the phones are said to be at
a "ten-dash" level. This comes from the Qualcomm part numbering system where generic phone assemblies
without any customer specific information such as software, roaming tables or labeling are given part
numbers with the prefix "10-". Finally these ten-dash phones have the customer-specific information
applied to the phone and they are packed and shipped into finished goods inventory.
2.3.2 SUPPLY CHAIN OVERVIEW
The supply chain for handsets is very similar to the supply chain for personal computer systems, especially
the supply chain of notebook computers. In a typical handset there are nearly 1000 components from
hundreds of different suppliers. However, like in the computer industry, most of the cost is concentrated in
less than 10 components supplied by less than 5 different vendors. For Qualcomm, the most expensive
components are the radio chipsets called MSMs (Modem Station Modules). These are like the
microprocessors in a personal computer. The timing of the release of a new MSM dictates the timing of the
release of a new handset product family. In addition, MSMs are the primary determinant of what features a
particular handset can provide. QCP is both blessed and cursed in that its sister division QCT designs and
sells the MSMs to them. While QCP enjoys the advantages of being in the same company with its major
supplier in terms of scheduling delivery and obtaining pricing, it also has the disadvantage that it is locked
into a sole supplier for its most significant component.
Also, like the supply chain of the notebook computer industry in the early days, QCP is constantly plagued by
rapidly growing and volatile demand that creates endless headaches from part shortages. In the early days of
the notebook computer industry, LCD panel supply often limited system production. In CDMA handsets, it
is often FLASH memory or ultra low-noise amplifiers that constrain production. And like in the early days of
the notebook computer industry, the larger players like Nokia possess greater buyer power and are at a
distinct advantage when the supply of a critical component is constrained.
2.3.3 ORDER FULFILLMENT
Order fulfillment is an area where the similarity between consumer CDMA handsets and computer systems
ends. QCP does not sell handsets to consumers directly. Instead, QCP sells to the large wireless service
providers like Sprint PCS, Bell Atlantic Mobile and Airtouch Cellular. These three companies make up nearly
90% of QCP demand. These large customers consistently try to "brand the service" and as such they require
their handset providers to place their brand name on the lens of the handset and in the software instead of
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the manufacturer's brand name. This complicates the order fulfillment process by requiring QCP to build and
to stock handsets customized for each service provider that it services.
There is an additional complicating factor here as well. The service providers have to qualify a handset on
their network prior to committing to purchase phones. This often represents a six-week period after phones
are ready to enter full production, where the service providers are qualifying the handsets. Most often, during
this time QCP builds phones speculatively to level production knowing that it is very likely that problems will
emerge during the qualification process requiring the inventory to be reworked. Aside from this qualification
period, there are other reasons that QCP has to stock phones speculatively including seasonality of demand
and the incredible volatility both in overall market-wide demand and volatility in QCP's demand created by
competitor's product introductions.
The combination of stocking handsets customized for a particular customer and stocking them speculatively
creates situations that the service providers often use to their advantage. For example, suppose QCP had
speculatively stocked 10,000 handsets fully customized for Bell Atlantic that it would normally sell for $100
per phone. Now suppose that Bell Atlantic knows that QCP has these phones in stock customized for Bell
Atlantic and that it will cost QCP $10 per handset to rework them and sell them to someone else for $100.
Bell Atlantic will offer to pay $90.01. QCP's best move will be to sell them for that price and more often
than not, they do.
2.4 CDMA HANDSET MANUFACTURING INFORMATION FLOW
2.4.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AND BUILD PLANS
The most critical information flowing through QCP manufacturing on a daily basis is the configuration
information. This information is delivered to manufacturing in what are referred to as build plans. Build
plans essentially tell manufacturing exactly what to build, how many to build and when to build. Build plans
change frequently for many different reasons. Early in a product's life cycle, the main reasons are typically
engineering changes, bug fixes and the like. Later in the life cycle components may be changed to reduce
costs, consolidate the supply base or to refresh the product by adding a new feature. At the end of the life
cycle, the build plans change as components reach their end-of-life and can no longer be found.
Build plans are also different depending on the location or site that is doing the manufacturing and its
inventory situation. Part of every engineering change order is a material disposition statement. Basically, this
tells manufacturing when to "cut-in" the change, what to do with the material already in the pipeline and what
type of rework is required for completed units in the pipeline. Typically, different sites have different
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inventory situations for a given part and will cut in an engineering change at different times. Thus, each site
might have a different build plan.
Often, there are complex and unforeseen interactions between changes in different parts of this system. A
small change on the CCA at one site may interact with the particular type of solder paste that is being used.
Communicating this information quickly and efficiently throughout the organization and maintaining
traceability are necessary to identify problems early and solve them quickly. This is especially critical in an
extremely high volume environment such as QCP where failures add up very quickly.
2.4.2 COMPONENT SELECTION AND PROCUREMENT
Another area where proper information flow is critical is in component selection and procurement. Here the
design team must work closely with manufacturing and procurement to produce a design or set of designs
capable of incorporating the lowest cost components both now and in the future. An example of this type of
interaction is the design of the radio. Here the design engineer might initially specify a power amplifier that is
extremely difficult to obtain because supply is constrained. This part selection could negatively affect the
overall profitability of the product if this part constrains the production of handsets. By working closely with
procurement the correct design tradeoffs can be made between price, performance, quality and availability.
2.4.3 DESIGN FOR MANUFACTURING FEEDBACK
The proper flow of design for manufacturing information is critical to the long-term reduction of costs and
improvement of quality. The design engineers must understand the process capabilities in place in
manufacturing and the cost and availability of new manufacturing technologies. As before, proper
information flow between manufacturing and development will enable the proper tradeoffs to be made. In
this case, the tradeoffs are between labor, capital, quality and manufacturing ramp rate.
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CHAPTER 3: THE OUTSOURCING DECISION
3.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter analyzes the decision to outsource manufacturing along three dimensions: financial, operational
and strategic. From each of these different perspectives, this chapter will present the major areas that should
be considered with special emphasis given to those that are most often overlooked. All of this is done while
giving special attention to unique aspects of the consumer wireless handset market. These unique aspects
include:
" A product cost structure dominated by bill of material (BOM) costs.
" Product costs that, on average, decline about 5% per quarter.
- Product actual selling prices (ASPs) that, on average, decline about 6% per quarter.
" Seasonality and volatility in the consumer demand pattern.
" Products sold through a few very large and powerful channels (Service Providers).
" Product life cycles of about 1.5 years and shortening.
All of these things affect the landscape of the outsourcing decision and produce circumstances where the
conventional ways of looking at such things as the total cost of inventory as the sum of the holding costs and
the cost of additional working capital are not sufficient. Throughout this chapter, outsourcing decisions are
viewed as two decisions made simultaneously: a vertical integration decision and a facilities location decision.
As such, much of the information in this chapter draws from research, both quantitative and qualitative, on
how these decisions are best approached.
3.2 THE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE
3.2.1 OVERVIEW
To understand the financial aspects of a decision to outsource the manufacture of a product, first you must
understand both the structure and the dynamics of the product's costs. The structural view of the costs
reveals such important things as labor content, raw material content and conversion costs. Additionally, the
cost structure will reveal the breakdown between fixed and variable costs for a product. This static picture of
the costs paints only a part of the financial picture when it comes to the decision to outsource manufacturing.
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We must also consider the more dynamic aspects of cost. In this regard, we must consider such things as the
rate of change of component prices, the rate of change of technology and lastly the volatility in consumer
demand. We must take into account any
evident trends in market growth, component
n Diret Labor. a Faciltly/Uility/
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reasonable financial picture to use when o.6%
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a Quality
For a CDMA handset, the structure of the costs Ass"ance
is dominated by the direct material costs of the Figure 2: CDMA Handset Cost Structurefor the QCP-
major components. Figure 2 shows the cost 860 model handset (August 1999)
breakdown for a typical CDMA handset manufactured in Qualcomm's San Diego facility. As you can see,
the cost structure is heavily dominated by material costs. These material costs, primarily the costs of the
larger more sophisticated components such as the MSMs, represents over 90% of the total production costs
of the handset. Also, note that while direct labor represents the second largest cost area, it only represents
approximately 3% of the production cost. Understanding the structure of the costs in this way allows us to
make an educated prioritization about where to focus cost reduction efforts. In this situation, focusing
management attention on procurement or
m Actual Selling Price (ASP) declines at -6% per Quarter
increasing the role of procurement early in the * Production Costs fall at -5% per Quarter
design process may produce positive results. $160AS
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the total cost effects on the supply chain. For $100
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example, we can develop a model for the total $80
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cost of inventory including the cost of inventory Cost uarter
re-valuations, holding costs, shrinkage and
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outsourcing alternatives. Many of these Quacomm Finance
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Figure 3. The figure demonstrates the profit margin erosion that takes place in a very dynamic market such
as the one for cellular phones or computers. For CDMA handsets after introduction into the market, ASP
(the top curve in the graph) historically decays at about 6% per quarter while total production costs (the lower
solid curve) historically decay at about 5% per quarter. The effect of inventory in a system like this is that it
introduces a delay between the time when costs are settled and locked in and when the selling price is locked
in. This delay can be depicted graphically by shifting the lower cost curve to right by the amount of delay
introduced by the system inventory (see the lower dashed line).
For Qualcomm and for many other companies this cash-to-cash cycle effect erodes profit margins. Worse
yet, it often does this without being fully captured by conventional accounting systems. In most accounting
systems, this type of erosion will only show up on the books partially in the form of inventory re-valuations.
For the example handset in the figure with a $100 bill of materials cost, each day added to the cash-to-cash
cycle is equivalent to approximately $0.06 of material costs. Beyond these costs, additional costs are incurred
with lengthy cash-to-cash delays. As the cost curve shifts to the right with increased inventory, the point at
which the ASP curve meets the cost curve is pulled in. This reduces the profitable life of a product and
places greater strain on the development organization to produce the next generation product.
3.2.2 OUTSOURCING AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON COST STRUCTURE
The largest potential positive financial effect of outsourcing is in the cost structure of the product. That is,
both the material and the labor costs can often be reduced through outsourcing manufacturing. There are
three main reasons why contract manufacturers can possess a cost advantage in these areas. First, third party
electronics manufacturers such as SCI and Solectron may have the ability to pool production orders from
several different OEMs such as Qualcomm and thereby achieve scale advantages in procurement and
inbound freight. In addition, large contract manufacturers through this pooling effect can exert significantly
more market power than many of the smaller OEMs that they represent could individually. Second,
contractors can, in theory, pool variability in demand as well and therefore reduce proportionally the amount
of raw material inventory that they must hold. Finally, contractors during the selling period often make
arguments that manufacturing is their core competency and that in the end they will be able to provide
steeper cost reductions and better quality than the OEM could if operating alone.
All of these potential cost advantages are just that: potential advantages. To achieve scale in procurement or
shipping or to be able to exert significantly more buyer power than the OEMs could individually requires two
things. First, the contractor must have significantly more scale than the OEM. At some point, the scale
advantage diminishes in relative importance. For a company the size of IBM, HP or Dell, it is doubtful that
the contractor could offer any significant scale advantages. Second, it is important that the products being
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pooled together by the contractor be very similar. If the products being produced are similar, they will have
similar parts or sub-components from common suppliers that can be pooled together to achieve scale and
experience advantages or to increase buyer power. More importantly, similarity in the products often means
similarity in the processes used to manufacture them. Similarity in the processes used could create scale
advantages for contractors in engineering or other technical support activities if they can spread these people
across different OEM's products and better utilize them.
Just like pooling volumes, pooling variability to create an advantage also requires significant similarities in
both product and process. In addition, it requires that the demand streams from the multiple OEMs being
served by the contractor be either uncorrelated with each other or negatively correlated (i.e., the correlation
must be less than zero). When the correlation between the multiple demand streams being served by the
contractor is less than zero, variations in demand from one OEM over time will tend to be cancel the
variations from another. This will require the inventory held by the contractor to buffer proportionally less
variation in demand and thereby be reduced. A reduction in inventory will translate directly into a reduction
in costs for the contractor that could be passed along to the OEM. Again, this only happens to any
appreciable degree when there is significant similarity. Moreover, there is the counterbalancing effect that
when there is a significant amount of similarity, there is often a high degree of positive correlation in demand.
The assertion that because manufacturing is their core competency, contract manufacturers can deliver
steeper cost reductions and better quality again is typically only true under certain conditions. First,
manufacturing is an extremely broad area in which to claim competency. Manufacturing refrigerators is vastly
different from manufacturing cellular phones or laptop computers. In this regard, the overall maturity of the
type of product must be taken into account. Computers have just recently reached a point where processes
and equipment for manufacturing and testing them have become more or less standard and people skilled in
these areas are readily available. The manufacture of the latest CDMA handsets uses cutting edge technology
and highly customized and specific test equipment and procedures. Furthermore, there are relatively few
people available with knowledge and experience manufacturing CDMA handsets. Because of this, it is more
difficult for a contractor to leverage existing competencies and provide steeper cost reductions and improved
quality in the short run. In the end, however, these things can be learned and the contractor, by working with
many different OEMs, may in fact be able to outperform any individual OEM.
Aside from the technical aspects that are required for the contractor to have a cost advantage over the OEM,
one must constantly be reminded that the true core competency of the contract manufacturer is being a
contract manufacturer and knowing how best to play and win that game. Instead of asking how much of a
cost advantage the contractor has, the question often becomes how much of this cost advantage will be
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passed on to the OEM through lower prices. Game theory would suggest that the contractor would only
pass along enough savings to ensure that the price offered is both less than the cost of the OEM
manufacturing it in-house and low enough to make the return on switching to another contractor slightly
negative. In reality, the best the OEM can hope to do is to create clear performance and cost reduction goals
and metrics as early as possible in the negotiation process while the cost of switching to another contractor is
negligible. This is the point when the OEM has the most bargaining power. Unfortunately, this is also the
point where the contract manufacturers typically have greater domain knowledge than the OEMs.
3.2.3 OUTSOURCING AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON DYNAMIC COSTS
The largest potentially negative financial effects of outsourcing are from the more dynamic effects on
inventory, lead times and the lengthened cash-to-cash cycle. As discussed earlier, lengthening the cash-to-
cash cycle time will increase the margin erosion problem. If an OEM chooses to outsource only a portion of
the production process such as surface mount technology (SMT), it will likely increase the cash cycle and
erode margins. Often, OEMs will only see the structural cost savings such as a reduction in direct labor cost.
The effect of reduced structural cost savings on the example depicted in Figure 3 is to shift the lower solid
cost curve down. However, if any additional pipeline inventory is associated with that structural cost savings,
Little's law would tell us that the cash-to-cash time will also be increased, thereby shifting the cost curve out
to the right. Because of the exponential nature of the curve, these two effects tend to work against one
another. There is a point where any cost structure savings are completely offset by the eroded margin. Full
outsourcing, where the contractor actually ships the finished goods to the customers and manages the
finished goods inventory, could deliver the cost savings without increasing the cash cycle. In some cases,
arrangements of this sort can actually reduce the cash-to-cash cycle. However, ceding control of the end
customer experience to a contractor is not something to be done lightly and will likely only work well for
mature product categories with well established brands.
3.2.4 OTHER INDIRECT COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OUTSOURCING
There are other, possibly significant financial costs of outsourcing manufacturing that should also be taken
into consideration:
- Additional Information Technology (IT) - Successfully integrating your IT system with the
contractor's IT system is something that must be done for the relationship to succeed. A good
contract manufacturer can provide a great deal of support in this regard. A recent Wall Street
Journal article commented on the tight relationship between Flextronics, the world's fourth
largest EMS provider, and Cisco, an OEM manufacturer of Internet routers. The article stated
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that Flextronics' computers are so closely tied to Cisco that Flextronics often can build and ship
a product faster than a customer can obtain the same model off a distributor's shelf. By building
products based on orders rather than on forecasts, Flextronics also lowers inventory costs. The
article concluded by saying, "Eventually, everybody will do it this way." However, large IT
projects can swell budgets and shift timetables quickly.
= Additional Travel - If the contract manufacturer is in a remote location, frequently people must
travel down to the contractor's site to resolve problems or to train people. These costs should
tail off after the relationship with the contractor reaches maturity, but in the early stages of the
relationship, these costs can be significant.
" Legal - There will be many negotiations and many documents that must be reviewed by lawyers.
In a large firm, this may not represent an incremental cost as many large firms have legal staff in-
house. However, smaller firms must budget for this.
= Management time and attention - This is very difficult to quantify. Ideally, management time and
attention should be spent on improving the core area of the business, not in endless negotiations
or performance reviews with the contract manufacturer. The main reason to establish a
relationship with a contract manufacturer is to shed non-core functions of the business and to
allow managers to focus their time and attention on building the critical capabilities of the
business. When establishing an outsourcing relationship, ensure that the structure of the
contract is not such that more management time and attention is spent maintaining the
outsourcing relationship than would have been spent if the production were in-house.
3.3 THE OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
3.3.1 OVERVIEW
Aside from the purely financial ramifications of choosing to outsource some or all of manufacturing, there
are operational and organizational ramifications as well. While these often lead to real financial effects, it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible to present a method for quantifying these for the many different types of
organizations that exist. This section does not attempt to present such definite rules. Instead, the goal of this
section is to present a survey of the types of operational and organizational issues that will emerge as a firm
first considers and then engages in an outsourcing relationship.
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3.3.2 COMMUNICATION
A decision to outsource manufacturing is inherently a facilities location decision as well. When considering
contract manufacturers in different locations, the distances between manufacturing and other functions
within the organization must also be taken into account. Figure 4 at the right demonstrates a somewhat
empirical relationship that describes the amount of communication as a function of distance. In determining
the location requirements for your outsourcing partner or even if you should outsource manufacturing at all,
you must take into account the effect that this
distance will have on cross-functional
communication within the organization.
Reducing the level of cross-function
communication will have different effects on
different types of organizations. Like most &
aspects of outsourcing, there are few one-size-fits-
all solutions. Companies with very mature
products that compete primarily using cost,
marketing and branding will suffer less from a
reduced level of communication between product
design and manufacturing than a company that *stance
competes primarily on having the latest Figure 4: Decreasing communication with increasingphysica/
technology or styling. However, even for those separation Takenfrom 'Are there Laws' of
companies who compete on technology and Manufacturing" y John D. C. Little.
styling, there may be ways for them to modularize their product in a way that would allow them to take
advantage of an outsourcing relationship. Companies such as these may be able to modularize their product
architecture to isolate the subassemblies containing the innovative technology or impacting the styling of the
unit.
Generally, decreasing the amount of cross-functional communication hinders such important activities as
design for manufacturing and continuous improvement efforts. In addition, there are many day-to-day
activities such as problem resolution and root cause analysis that will suffer if the area where the problems are
discovered communicates less with the area where the problems must be solved. Even when problems are
solved, implementing engineering changes in a coordinated manner can be an amazingly difficult task. Often
outsourcing arrangements fail to consider these vitally important functions because they "just happen" when
manufacturing is performed in-house. However, when the manufacturing facility is a part of a different
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company, in a different country with a different language these day-to-day activities stop "just-happening."
When this happens there can be serious financial consequences such as missed deliveries, increased scrap
material and reduced quality.
3.3.3 LOGISTICS
Outsourcing manufacturing can introduce several types of logistical problems as well. This is especially true
when a company only partially outsources or contracts out only a portion of its manufacturing need. Partial
outsourcing can take two forms. A company might choose to partially outsource by product by only
contracting some products and manufacturing the remaining products in-house. Alternatively, a company
might choose to partially outsource by operation by only contracting out one part of a production process
and doing the remainder in-house. Each of these two forms presents difficult challenges to the logistics
organization.
Partial outsourcing will split the inbound material flow. Logistically this presents several difficulties. First,
splitting the inbound material flow will often split the raw material safety stock. This is true unless the two
manufacturing sites are close enough to be serviced from one central warehouse. Splitting the safety stocks
will increase the total amount of safety stock that must be carried and increase inventory expenses. In
addition, when an engineering change order is issued and parts in inventory must be dispositioned, scrap
costs are increased. Second, in industries experiencing enormous growth such as the wireless handset
industry, parts supply will often be constrained. This forces the material planners to prioritize the allocation
of parts between in-house production and outsourced production. Some contractual arrangements will
require minimum volumes to be produced with the contractor. These contractual order "lock-ins" with the
contract manufacturer will tend to force these constrained parts to be allocated to the outsourced production
creating financial and possibly political problems with the in-house manufacturing. All of these factors can
create extra overhead and strain the material planning and logistics organizations.
Partial outsourcing by product can create other logistical problems. If demand for certain products is
geographically centered, then one outsourcing location may be right from a cost perspective for the first
product manufactured there but subsequent products might be at cost disadvantage due to excessive freight
or tariffs. For example, at Qualcomm, certain phone models are targeted more for the North American
market and other phone models are targeted more for the Asian market. While it might be beneficial to build
phones for the North American market in Mexico, it might be much less beneficial to build phones for the
Asian market there. If a company chooses to outsource partially by product, then during the selection
process for a contract manufacturing site, the company must consider both the immediate product to be
manufactured there and other products on the product roadmap. Relocating the site for the contract
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manufacturing with each new product or even every other product will have detrimental effects on the
effective rate of learning for both manufacturing and logistics.
Often, companies chose to outsource partially by function. The prime example of this are computer
companies that outsource the circuit card assembly (SMT) portion of production, yet do the final assembly
and shipping in-house. Partial outsourcing by function can have the potential downsides of increased freight,
longer lead-times, and possibly a longer cash-to-cash cycle. However, there are significant upsides as well.
Keeping final assembly in-house allows the OEM to ensure final product quality and better control the
customer experience.
3.3.4 ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
As a company begins a process to determine if outsourcing manufacturing is the proper course of action,
many different organizational issues can threaten the process. Employee morale must be constantly managed
even before the decision process has begun. A rumor on the shop floor that upper management is even
considering outsourcing can lead to disastrous consequences especially where organized labor is concerned.
The only solution to this is to over-communicate from the very beginning. This is much easier said than it is
done. It will almost always seem easier to try to consider outsourcing covertly. After all, why risk upsetting
people before it is even certain that any manufacturing will actually be outsourced? The reality is that it is
nearly impossible to keep the kind of cross functional analysis necessary to make the proper outsourcing
decision a secret. News will eventually reach the shop floor and the air of secrecy surrounding the process
only leads imaginations to believe the worst. As soon as outsourcing becomes an option, formulate a
communications plan. In Strategic Outsourcing: A Structured Approach to Outsourcing Decisions and
Initiatives, Maurice F. Greaver even suggests appointing a member of the outsourcing team to be the
communications coordinator Responsibility for Making Strategic Make/Buy Decisions
throughout the process. It is this
-45%-
persons role to ensure that the goals and 40%U35%-
.2 30%
intentions of outsourcing are t 25%
0 15%-
communicated appropriately throughout 0 10%
o 5%
E 0%
the process.
0) 0
3.4 THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 0 c E
a: U
3.4.1 OVERVIEW
* successful Companies U Less Successful Companies
All too often decisions to outsource Figure 5: Who makes strategic make/buy decisions in an organization?
manufacturing are driven by tactical
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reasons such as meeting increased demand without adding capital or reducing direct costs in the next quarter.
These are not bad reasons at all. However, there are reasons why companies should consider outsourcing
relationships as strategic tools. Figure 5 represents a study conducted by McKinsey & Company of several
machinery and component manufacturers in both the U.S. and in Europe. The study found that the more
successful companies tended to make strategic make-versus-buy decisions at higher levels in the organization
while less successful companies tended to either make these decisions at lower levels in the organization or
worse yet they were likely to have no clearly defined process for making these decisions at all. Outsourcing
decisions, by their very nature require strategic focus in the decision-making process. An outsourcing
decision is more than just a make-versus-buy decision. Outsourcing decisions are a combination of two
decisions that are centrally important to the long-term well-being of a company. An outsourcing decision is
simultaneously a vertical integration decision and a facilities location decision.
A great deal of literature has been written discussing the strategic implications of vertical integration decisions
and facilities location decisions. However, when ChiefExecutive magazine and Andersen Consulting asked 382
CEOs if their approach to outsourcing was strategic, tactical or both, only 50% responded that their
approach was strategic (47% said tactical and 3% said both). Why then do so few companies approach this
decision as a fundamentally strategic question? The answer to this may lie in the fact that outsourcing
decisions are often forced by tactical events such as a sudden spike in demand or an immediate need to
reduce costs to hit analyst's estimates. Couple this with the fact that making these decisions in a strategic
manner is often difficult and time consuming and requires an analysis that spans across multiple functions,
and it quickly becomes evident why these decisions lack a strategic focus.
How does a company give its outsourcing decisions the strategic focus that they deserve? The framework
presented in the next chapter should provide a starting point. The main aspects that it considers are the
effect of the outsourcing relationship on a company's critical capabilities and the coherence of the
outsourcing relationship with the company's overall strategy and market position. These two primary aspects
of the strategic perspective are discussed further below.
3.4.2 CAPABILITIES AND CRITICAL CAPABILITIES
In a constantly changing competitive environment, the most important ability that any company can have is
the ability to respond rapidly and correctly to this change. Examples of this type of ability would be a
company's ability to consistently deliver the best technology to consumers at competitive prices or a
company's ability to consistently reduce costs. This type of ability is what Andrew Bartmess and Keith Cerny
call capabilities. Their definition of capability is:
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"...a company's proficiency in the business processes that allow it to
distinguish itself continually in ways that are important to its customers"
- "Seeding Plants for a Global Harvest," The McKinsgyQuarer#, 1993, Number 2.
Simply put, a capability is something that is learned by an organization or a group within an organization. A
capability is essentially organizational knowledge of a core business process that is captured in a business'
culture, its procedures or its leadership.
Capabilities, by themselves do not create a lasting competitive advantage. For example, a company may have
a unique understanding of a manufacturing process for making widgets. This unique process may even yield
a competitive advantage in terms of cost or quality of the widgets that they produce. Now suppose that this
unique understanding of the process is simply the settings for a particular machine. While this knowledge is a
capability, it does not create a source of a lasting competitive advantage because it can be easily copied by
competitors. This company's competitors could obtain the machine settings either by talking with the
machine supplier or by hiring away key employees with knowledge of these settings. The competitive
advantage gained through this sort of capability could vanish in an instant and as such is not a lasting
competitive advantage.
Capabilities that create a lasting competitive advantage are called critical capabilities. These capabilities
cannot be easily duplicated by competitors. Much like learning curves in manufacturing, critical capabilities
produce a sustainable competitive advantage because it is very difficult for competitors to catch up once a
company has a lead. Critical capabilities are the result of patient and often deliberate organizational learning.
This type of capability typically crosses several functional boundaries. Because critical capabilities are derived
from how organizations work together to solve problems, improve products and reduce costs, they cannot be
stolen away by competitors by hiring one or two key employees.
Critical capabilities are developed within an organization through frequent and often informal communication
between diverse groups. When deciding to outsource manufacturing, or for that matter any other function
within a company, the effect that this arrangement will have on the company's critical capabilities should be
considered.
3.4.3 INTEGRATION WITH OVERALL COMPANY STRATEGY
A manufacturing outsourcing decision needs to take into account the broader company strategy and its effect
on the manufacturing function. All too often, outsourcing decision makers fail to take into account the
overall company strategy and in doing so constrain the entire company. For example, start-up companies
might actually reduce their value to an acquirer by choosing to manufacture in-house. If this start-up is based
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on a new technology, it may pursue an overall strategy of positioning itself to be acquired by a larger
company. This larger company may have existing manufacturing capacity that can be retrofitted to
manufacture the newer technology. If the start-up has no in-house manufacturing capability, more synergies
may exist between the acquirer and the start-up and a higher price for the acquisition would be warranted.
However, if the start-up had made the decision to manufacture in-house, this in-house manufacturing
capability would most likely be of very little value to this acquirer and would likely provide a very small return
on the capital that was needed to build this in-house capability. Of course, this is not always true for every
start-up. There will always be cases where unique competencies that are not easily transferred can be
developed in manufacturing and in these cases, there can be significant value in developing in-house
manufacturing. This only reveals that the relationship between manufacturing strategy and overall company
strategy is definitely a two-way street with each critically important to the successful development of the
other.
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CHAPTER 4: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO OUTSOURCING
4.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The previous chapter presented many of the things that we should consider when making the decision to
outsource manufacturing. This chapter presents a structured framework for making these decisions. By
providing some structure to the decision-making process, greater balance and objectivity can be created. The
Figure 6: Outsourcing decision flow.
framework presented here tries to balance qualitative issues with quantitative metrics and also balance shorter
term tactical goals with longer term more strategic goals.
Figure 6 presents the overall flow of the decision-making framework. As tas thhe process flows from left to
right on the figure, its focus also moves from things external to the firm to things internal to the firm. The
process begins with a survey of the external environment the structure and the dynamics of the market for
both inputs and outputs. Next, the process focuses on the interface between manufacturing and both the
customer and the rest of the company. Here, an overall manufacturing strategy is developed that is consistent
with both the value that the firm hopes to provide to its customers and the overall strategy of the larger
organization. Finally, the process uses this information to determine the capabilities that must either exist or
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be created to successfully execute the manufacturing strategy and develops a plan for execution. All of these
items are covered in greater detail in the sections that follow.
As discussed in the previous chapter, to properly make an informed outsourcing decision both the structure
and the dynamics of the competitive environment should be taken into account. To manufacture products
successfully, we need to understand these things both on the input (supply) side and on the output (demand)
side of the business. This is placed first in the process, because in almost all cases these things are very
difficult for a firm to change and will serve as constraints throughout the remainder of the process. There
are, of course, cases where the rules of the game on either the input side or the output side can be changed
and when changed produce extraordinary results for the firm. Probably the best example of this is Dell
Computer Corporation. Dell dramatically changed the output dynamics by refusing to sell through the
ordinary distribution channels used by its competitors. Instead Dell created the "Direct Model" where it sells
directly to it end customers. This framework is in no way meant to prevent this type of innovation. Instead,
it is intended to be used as a means to more effectively target opportunities for such innovation by
highlighting the binding constraints. For example, had Dell gone through this framework taking the
conventional distribution channels as the given means of distribution for personal computers, they would
have seen that this method of distribution was not at all matched to the other dynamics of the industry and,
as such, was constraining their business. This would have allowed them to focus their innovative energy on
the question of "How can we change this and free ourselves from this constraint?" For them, the solution
was selling direct to customers through catalogs and the internet, for other companies it might be things like
supply-side auctions, demand-side auctions, altering sales force incentives or other creative ways of altering
the constraints on their businesses. The purpose of this framework is to provide a means to survey the
business and decide which constraint to tackle first.
Furthermore, the framework presented in this section focuses primarily on enhancing a company's
competencies and capabilities rather than on minimizing direct costs as the main decision driver. Costs are by
no means removed from the equation. Instead, costs are used as the determining factor only after the effects
on critical capabilities of the organization have been analyzed and considered. Manufacturing service
providers are evaluated primarily on how they can enhance the network of capabilities necessary to
successfully execute the broader company strategy. This is a much harder approach than simply issuing a
request for quotations and then contracting with the lowest bidder. Yet, much of the associated literature
suggests that this approach produces substantially higher returns to companies. In a recent issue of the
McKinseyQuarterly a survey of the U.S. and European machinery industry finds that what separates the leaders
from the laggards in this industry most are their relationships with their suppliers.
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"To select the right suppliers for such project-driven relationships, leaders
use criteria such as skill and willingness to enter into redesign projects,
while laggards use competitive bids almost exclusively. Leaders are also
willing to source globally in the pursuit of excellence: they buy 30 percent
of supplies abroad, laggards only 4 percent.. .The laggards' emphasis on low
costs rather than competence ignores the important role competent
suppliers can play in problem solving."
- "Virtual Virtical Integration: The Key to Success," The McKinseyQuartery, 1996
Number 3, pp. 160-163.
By incorporating external market dynamics, internal capabilities development and cross-functional cost
analysis, this framework provides a process for balancing short term cost and capacity issues with longer-term
capability and competitive advantage issues when making outsourcing decisions.
As we move through this decision framework, Qualcomm handset manufacturing and its situation will be
used as an example to illustrate many of the salient points.
4.2 IDENTIFY MARKET STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS
4.2.1 STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE MARKET FOR INPUTS
The structure of the inputs markets will vary somewhat across different industries, but there are general
structural categories that must be understood. In general, for almost every manufactured product a careful
analysis of the structure of inputs should consider:
" Labor:
What is the labor content in the product? What is the skill level required?
What is the current supply of skilled labor in the area?
What is the cost of this labor?
What is the relative productivity of this labor?
Is the labor in the area organized or unionized? How could this constrain your decision?
" Raw Materials:
What is the raw material content?
What are the proximity requirements? Is raw material transport costly?
Can raw materials be negotiated differently in different locations?
" Distribution:
What is the distribution method at the current site? How much does this cost?
How do competitors distribute their goods? How do you compare?
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Is there enough capacity at the current locale for now and in the future?
What is the time delay for distribution from the factory to the customer?
= Capital:
Do you have access to the necessary capital in your current location?
What are the costs of obtaining capital now?
= Supplier Position:
What is your company's position with its suppliers?
Are you a large customer or a small one?
How would outsourcing change this?
What position do your competitors have with the same suppliers?
" Technology:
Is there special technology used in the manufacture of your product?
Is this technology readily available in your area or the proposed area?
Are there taxes or export restrictions that should be considered?
Is expertise to service and maintain this equipment available?
Are there trade secrets that must be revealed to the third party?
Can more current technologies be acquired by locating in certain countries?
Many of these questions are quite easily answered, but often overlooked. In many cases, conventional cost
accounting systems will bias the decision maker to overemphasize one or two of these questions and neglect
the rest. The most often cited case of this is in the case of overhead allocation. Often overhead is allocated
based on headcount or labor costs. This, more often than not, will cause managers to focus too heavily on
labor cost when making facilities location decisions. In the end, while the accounting measure of allotted
overhead to the manufacturing function may go down, this overhead has not been reduced and must be
reallocated in other areas. In essence, the costs have been shifted around but not reduced. Worse yet,
sometimes these decisions actually increase the amount of overhead needed to support them.
There are also several dynamic aspects of the market for inputs that should be considered. Some of the
questions that must be addressed here are:
= Rate of Change in Technology:
How fast is the technology used changing?
What are the risks of obsolescence?
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R Volatility and Availability of Supply:
What is the rate of supplier turnover?
Are new suppliers entering and/or exiting the market frequently?
Are there other sources of instability in the supply-base such as lawsuits, currency risk or political
risk?
Historically, have there been availability problems for inputs (components, resources, labor,
etc.)?
- Rate of Price Change:
How quickly do the prices of the inputs change?
Are there any noticeable trends in pricing? What are the drivers of these trends? Will they last?
Of all of these areas, the last two often have the highest impact on overall profitability. For example, if there
is a great deal of volatility in the supply of necessary inputs which leads to frequent parts shortages in the
market for inputs, only the buyers with larger market power will be able to buy the constrained parts. This
volatility coupled with low supplier position will lead to unscheduled production stoppages and reduced
profits. The rate of price changes can affect profits by eroding margins as described in Chapter 3. Rapidly
eroding input prices coupled with long cycle times in production or distribution will lead to increased
inventory re-valuation and obsolescence costs and erode profits.
With any list of questions like this one some questions are far more relevant for a particular industry than for
another. In the case of high volume handset manufacturing at Qualcomm, it is readily apparent which
questions are critical. If we refer back to the handset cost structure on page 15, we can see that Qualcomm's
cost structure is dominated by raw material cost and that labor costs only constitute around 2% of total costs.
From this, we can surmise that raw material costs and parts availability are critical to sustaining operations.
Understanding the supplier position and the rate of growth in the industry can provide insight into the ability
to acquire the raw materials necessary to meet future demand. In addition, Qualcomm is in a technology
business with rapid technological change, declining component costs and rapidly growing and volatile
industry demand. This again emphasizes the importance of understanding fully Qualcomm's position with its
suppliers.
4.2.2 STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE MARKET FOR OUTPUTS
Analyzing the market structure for outputs requires that we ask a similar set of questions. Again, the specifics
of which issue will dominate will vary with industry or it may even vary between companies in the same
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industry. However, fundamentally these are the questions that should be answered when considering to
outsource manufacturing.
* Volume of Demand:
How many units of product do we plan to ship?
How is this demand geographically dispersed?
" Product Mix:
How many different versions of this product do we ship?
How many of these variations are due to localization?
What is the source of this differentiation (software, labels, packaging, hardware, etc.)?
How does our manufacturing process handle this variation?
Is the product designed in a modular fashion?
How does our manufacturing/distribution process handle this variation?
" Customers:
To how many customers do we sell directly?
Through what channels do we sell to end users?
What is the breakdown of sales by channel?
Are we selling to consumers or to other businesses?
" Size of Customers:
How big are our customers compared to us?
What share of their demand do we comprise?
Do we have any partnerships with them?
" Market Share:
What is our current share of the market? Where do we rank?
" Market Position:
How do we position our product in the market? Latest and greatest technology? Lowest costs?
Best quality? Best service and support?
" Brand Identity:
What is our company's brand identity?
How well is our brand name known (relative to our competition)?
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On the input side, the major force biasing the decision maker was the cost accounting system. Here, while
the cost accounting system does often muddy the waters, decision makers are most often biased by the
overestimates and underestimates of demand created by the sales incentive program employed by the
company. These systems often create incentives in the salesforce to create misleading projections of future
demand volumes. Often, salespeople have been known to "sandbag" or to underestimate demand for a
product so that their sales targets will be set lower and they will achieve a higher bonus. Likewise, there are
other incentive programs that cause salespeople to "pad" or to overestimate demand volume. While these
sorts of things alter the structural view of the output market, they also affect the dynamic picture of demand
by increasing demand volatility artificially.
The dynamic picture of the output side can be better understood by answering the following questions:
- Market Growth:
How fast is the overall market growing?
How fast is our share of the market growing?
- Volatility in Demand:
How variable is demand? How well have we been able to forecast it?
What are the sources of this variability? Can we affect these?
Is this variability real or is it a "Beer Game" or bullwhip effect?
Is there seasonality in the demand stream?
" Volatility in Mix:
What is the volatility in product mix demand? What is the source of this demand?
Are we creating some of this variability ourselves through new product announcements and/or
advertising?
On the demand side of the picture the most important concept is volatility. Volatility in demand volume will
force the company to buffer the variation with inventory, excess capacity or in the worst case lost sales.
Again, this is the place where certain structural properties, when combined with the right dynamics, can spell
disaster for a company's profitability. For example, suppose a company has a highly volatile demand stream
for its products. If that company makes the choice to increase its product mix and offer its products in five
different colors and chooses to stock each color, the finished goods inventory will have to explode by a factor
of approximately twenty-five to maintain the same service level without losing any sales. This highlights the
fact that understanding and managing the volatility in mix also play a crucial role in profitability. While
increased volatility in demand will force a company to alter its inventory policy, increased volatility in mix will
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likely force a company to change the way it designs and manufactures its products. In the example above, if
the company had introduced five different colors as covers that could be applied easily post-production,
inventory could still be held in generic form with the colors only being applied when the true demand is
known. In this case, inventory would only have to increase by the amount of the cost of the snap-on colored
plastic covers.
Though this list may seem extensive at first, people close to the action can answer many of these questions
very quickly and easily. This is exactly the case at Qualcomm. Employees in the order fulfillment area can
describe demand patterns with ease. Likewise, people in the procurement department know the state of the
supply chain intimately. The problem lies in the fact that the answers to these questions are often so obvious
to the people doing the work that they are never communicated explicitly and therefore never shared or
integrated into a complete picture except possibly at the highest levels in the organization. A complete
picture of the market for both inputs and outputs allows the proper trade-offs to be made more effectively.
Furthermore, having the right information communicated to the lower levels of the organization allows these
trade-offs to be made more quickly.
4.3 IDENTIFY KEY SOURCES OF CUSTOMER VALUE RELATIVE TO THE COMPETITION
In this next step in the framework, the company decides how to position itself between the inputs market and
the outputs market and provide value both to the customer and to the shareholder. In this step, we will take
what we have learned in the previous two sections and combine it with the overall company strategy to
determine how we will provide value to the customer relative to the competition.
The first set of questions that we must ask as we go through this is "What is our overall company strategy
with regard to this product? Is it to seed the market? Is it to be complimentary to some other aspect of the
company? Is it growth in market share? Or is this a core business where the survival of the company is
dependent upon it becoming profitable?" Like many of the other questions throughout this framework, these
are very simple questions that are often never asked to the right person. Often the reason they are never
asked is because everyone makes the misguided assumption that everyone else already knows the strategy.
Or, in the case of Qualcomm, there might be significant organizational repercussions if the CEO were to
announce that the company was only in the handset business to seed the market for CDMA technology and
they did not plan to be in it after that goal had been accomplished. Whether or not the question can be
openly asked and answered, it is important that the decision maker within the company understands and feels
confident in the answer to be able to make the proper decision on outsourcing.
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Once it is determined where this product fits into the overall strategy of the company, we must determine
how best to both execute the overall strategy and to provide value to the customer. Here, we use the
knowledge gained about the outputs market, the current product positioning and brand identity. Next, we
must choose how value will be delivered to the customers going forward. Will the product be positioned as
the lowest cost, latest and greatest technology, best performance, best service/support or some combination
of these?
In the case of Qualcomm, we could easily make a customer value statement that is consistent with its overall
strategy of seeding the market for CDMA technology. It would read something like, "Deliver CDMA
handsets at competitive costs that showcase the latest and greatest CDMA technology by providing leading
edge features and performance."
4.4 DEVELOP AN OVERALL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
The next step in the framework dictates that we craft a manufacturing strategy based on what we have
discovered so far. First, we decide how the product will be manufactured. Will the product be built-to-stock,
built-to-order, or some combination of the two like configure-to-order? Next we must decide such important
issues as how the supply chain will be structured and how we will exist within it. And lastly, we must decide
upon the optimal mixture of labor and capital.
The question of how to manufacture the product depends on several factors. First, we consider the fixed
cost versus variable cost composition of the manufacturing process. Second, we develop an understanding of
the amount and type of product mix and the volatility of both the mix and the overall demand. Finally, it is
necessary to consider the flexibility and modularity of both the product design and the manufacturing
process. There are no hard and fast rules and there are other important factors to consider, but there are
some clear trends. A product dominated by fixed costs will tend to be better suited to a build-to-plan
environment because the final unit costs will be highly negatively correlated with fixed cost utilization.
Inversely, a product dominated by variable costs will be better suited for a build-to-order system.
Furthermore, a product with a broader product mix and greater volatility in either demand volume or mix
would tend to be better suited for a build-to-order system over build-to-plan. However, if there is very little
flexibility either in the design or in the manufacturing process, it may be impossible to manufacture using
build-to-order or even configure-to-order. There are situations when a compromise solution such as
configure to order works best. One such example is the manufacture of CDMA handsets. The first two steps
in the process (see page 10 for the process flow), SMT and test, are heavily dominated by fixed costs while
the last step in the process, final assembly, is dominated by variable costs. In the face of highly volatile
demand and significant product mix, the proper solution is build-to-plan up through test, hold generic
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inventory at that point and then configure-to-order out of that inventory. This solution provides maximum
utilization of the fixed cost resources with a minimum of excess safety stock.
The structure of the supply chain was something that once had to be taken as a given for all but the largest
companies in an industry. Now, new technologies that allow for online auctions of components and even
capacity have leveled the playing field. Today, even smaller companies can use technologies such as these in
clever ways to affect the structure of the supply chain. In addition, adjustments to the product design can
affect the structure and center of power in the supply chain. Modular product architectures can create
markets for subassembly modules. An OEM has a great deal of power to structure the supply chain by
altering the boundaries of these modules. What makes this more difficult is that the suppliers are also
attempting to do this at the same time. For example, in the personal computer industry in the early 1990s
Intel incorporated level 2 cache into the processor module with the introduction of the Pentium Pro. Before
this time, level 2 cache had been part of the motherboard assembly. By doing this Intel was able to grab
ownership and control of another aspect of the PC architecture from the motherboard manufacturers and the
system OEMs. Later Intel was able use this control to specify the connector, the Slot I, for the
processor/cache assembly and used this power to against its competitors by not allowing the specification to
be made public. This had two very positive effects for Intel. First, the Slot I allowed them to reduce the cost
of the assembly and increase its margins. And second, the Slot I provided another barrier for their
competitors in that it was one more thing that they were forced to reverse engineer.
Finally, the company's strategy should strive to incorporate a full understanding of the optimal mix of labor
and capital for its location and industry. For many industries, the answer to this question is fairly obvious,
but for others this question is a very difficult one to answer. For a company like Qualcomm the answer is
fairly obvious. At Qualcomm, most of the value in product is produced during the SMT stage of production.
This operation is highly automated by its very nature and would likely be impossible to do otherwise. An
apparel manufacturer might be faced with the opposite problem: a product with so much variability that it
would be impossible to fully automate such things as the cut and sew process. For many companies this
decision is not that clear. For companies such as automotive suppliers, there are often choices between
automation and labor. Their decisions are often complicated further by their relationships with organized
labor and their deep ties to a particular geographic region.
4.5 IDENTIFY THE CRITICAL CAPABILITIES NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THIS STRATEGY
Once the manufacturing strategy has been developed, we must then decide what critical capabilities are
necessary to achieve and sustain this strategy. Again, remember that critical capabilities are those that provide
a source of lasting competitive advantage. They are cross-functional and are the result of patient
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organizational learning and as such they are difficult to develop. We need to fully understand them at this
point in the outsourcing decision process so that we can construct our manufacturing network to strengthen
and enhance these capabilities. Some potential critical capabilities are:
" Rapid Product Design and Introduction * Delivering Individually Custom
Configured Products
* Flexible Manufacturing
a Continuous Cost Reduction
" Integrated Product Design and
Purchasing 0 Providing products as a part of a total
custom solution.
It may seem at first that all of these things are desirable. In fact, they all are. The reality is however, that few
companies can manage to be the best in all of these areas. The purpose of selecting the one or two critical
capabilities for your company is to provide the focus necessary to build a sustainable competitive advantage.
The important thing here is not to pick the one that you believe that you are already good at, but to select the
one or two that you must be great at to accomplish the strategy set forth in the last section.
Each of these capabilities is better or worse suited for different manufacturing strategies. For example,
Qualcomm is faced with input volatility and output volatility in both mix and volume, and has chosen to
compete by offering the latest and greatest CDMA technology. Suppose that Qualcomm selects the
compatible manufacturing strategy of building phones to the generic level and then configuring them based
on actual orders. Which capabilities should Qualcomm focus on building into critical capabilities? The
tendency as you look down the list is to pick them all. However, for Qualcomm the first two, Rapid Product
Design and Introduction and Flexible Manufacturing seem to me to be the most congruent with their strategy
and their competitive environment. Excelling in these two areas could ensure a source of lasting competitive
advantage congruent with the company's overall strategy and current position.
4.6 IDENTIFY THE CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL LINKS
After deciding which capabilities of the organization are critical, we then determine which links within the
organization are most important to sustain and strengthen these critical capabilities. To do this, we examine
where these critical capabilities cross functional or external interfaces. That is, how should information flow
through the organization to create the organizational learning that is crucial to the development of a lasting
advantage? After determining this, we then assess the requirements for co-location or proximity to support
these links.
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In the case of Qualcomm, if we take rapid product introduction and flexible manufacturing as the two critical
capabilities, it would follow that the organizational links with the most crucial information flows would be
along the link between manufacturing and product design. The links between manufacturing and purchasing
and product design and purchasing are important as well given the volatility of the supply base and the need
to design in some flexibility to substitute components. All of these links should be considered the critical
organizational links that we would like to strengthen as we make our outsourcing decision.
We strengthen these organizational links by ensuring communication is at a maximum between these
functions. As we saw in Chapter 3, one of the more important factors affecting inter-functional
communication is distance. However, the relationship shown there only shows a general trend with distance.
In fact, the need for proximity between functions also depends on the functions themselves and the type of
work being performed and the type of information being exchanged. In their article "Seeding Plants for a
Global Harvest," Keith Cerny and Andrew Bartmess highlight some of the other factors that affect the need
for proximity. These are listed below:
= Complexity of Information - Highly complex information will dramatically increase the need for
proximity across an organizational link.
= Required Levels of Interaction - If a high degree of interaction is required, the need for
proximity increases. A link that only requires monthly status reports will have a lower proximity
need than one where weekly in-depth design reviews are required.
= Similarity of Background and Expertise - Two engineering groups can work together from a
distance much better than an engineering group and a marketing group. Functions with different
ways of approaching problems and different backgrounds have higher proximity needs.
= Requirements for a Trust-based Relationship - If the information flowing across the interface
requires a high degree of trust, then there are higher proximity needs. This is the primary reason
why legal advice and consulting advice are often delivered in person.
= "Concreteness" of Information - Abstract information such as how a product should look or
feel is often very difficult to communicate from a distance. Abstract information flows place a
higher need for proximity.
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New technologies are constantly changing how each of these factors affects the need for proximity. But even
if the effect is mitigated somewhat by new technologies, the overall direction of the effect is the same and
should be considered when determining the need for proximity.
Once the need for proximity across the critical links has been determined, it is useful to map out the links as
shown in Figure 15. The horizontal axis represents increasing need for proximity and the vertical axis
represents increasing current degree of proximity. Each of the 'bubbles' on the graph relate to inter-
functional or external links. A map
like this one allows us to
understand the implications of Sales Manur - P'oduct Design Product Design 4
Manuacturing
relocating or outsourcing a
CD
function. This is especially D ) Product Design
L-P~ctoessscs~mr
important when the functions that Custorners Sales Custmers
are being considered affect the .' 2
organizational links that are crucial 15 Manufi
=3Contract Mmbanrng
to supporting the development of
the critical capabilities of the
organization. Need for Proximity
After creating a map such as this
Figure 7: Example of mapping critical links (Adaptedfrom "Seeding Plants for
one for an organization's critical a Global Harvest," Keith Cerny and Andrew Bartmess)
links, the map is used to craft a
plan for developing the network to strengthen the critical links and thereby strengthen the critical capabilities.
As this plan is developed, we do not try to achieve the perfect network all at once. Instead, we look for
progressions of moves where each move strengthens the entire network.
4.7 IDENTIFY CANDIDATES TO OUTSOURCE OR TO INTERNALIZE
As we identify the moves that would enhance information flows and strengthen critical capabilities, functions
that are candidates for either outsourcing or internalizing will emerge. Functions with low proximity needs
should be considered candidates for outsourcing. Inversely, functions with high proximity needs might need
internalizing. There may even be only particular subsets of a function that make good candidates for
outsourcing. For example, for the manufacturing function we might look at circuit card manufacturing,
plastics manufacturing and final assembly separately. From this we might conclude that the product design to
manufacturing interface is much more critical for circuit card design and manufacturing than it is for plastics
design and manufacturing.
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Just as we might chose to outsource only one part of a function, we might also choose to outsource only a
part of the volume. This can appear to be a solution that will deliver the best of both worlds: maintained
communication through proximity for the in-house volume and reduced cost and increased flexibility for the
outsourced volume. This, in fact, can often be a mirage. First, much of the inter-functional communication
that takes place is informal communication and as such never makes it to the outsourced location. This was
very much the case at Qualcomm, as engineers would make tweaks to the production process or to the test
software and these adjustments would never be made to the off-site production lines. Partial outsourcing will
require formalization of these interfaces: processes by which critical information such as engineering change
requests or manufacturing procedures changes are captured and synchronized with off-site manufacturing.
Formalization of these information flows can, in fact, hinder information flow by adding extra overhead to
each transaction. Second, partial outsourcing reduces the volume of products being outsourced. This forces
the additional overhead necessary to support outsourcing activities such as site visits, quality audits and
contract negotiations to be spread over a smaller volume thereby reducing the intended cost benefits of
outsourcing. In addition, outsourcing only part of the total volume reduces learning rate for both the in-
house production and the outsourced production.
Partial outsourcing can be beneficial, but it is by no means a silver bullet. Partial outsourcing works best when
there are effective means available for the transfer of learnings from one site to the other and the outsourced
volumes come from older, more mature classes of products. These products are already on the flat part of
the learning curve and if the learnings from in-house production can be effectively transferred to the
outsourced production, there will be less of a learning curve penalty for splitting the volume. This scenario
also has three other benefits. First, transferring older products offsite opens up capacity in-house where new
products can be introduced and ramped more rapidly. Second, near the end of a product's life, it must
compete less on features and technology and more on price. Outsourcing, when done correctly, can provide
lower costs. Lastly, there is also a strategic benefit in that the contract manufacturer does not learn how to
manufacture the cutting edge technology until it is no longer cutting edge. This prevents the contract
manufacturer from transferring vital knowledge to a competitor or forward integrating and competing directly
with the OEM.
The last thing we note about partial outsourcing is that the information flows across the link should be
formalized first and then the function should be outsourced. Often companies will believe that their
processes need to be more formal and they will try to use outsourcing as a tool to add organizational
discipline. While this often does create the desired organizational discipline, it is invariably the most
expensive and organizationally difficult way to do so. Formalizing the link first will prevent a proper decision
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to outsource a function from becoming the catchall excuse for every problem that would have occurred
anyway.
4.8 PERFORM QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ON CANDIDATES
Once candidates to outsource have been identified, we evaluate the financial returns of each possibility.
Creating a quantitative cost model does this. The model used during the internship is presented in Appendix
A and can be used as a starting point for other companies. This model attempts to capture both the upfront
marginal investment required and the ongoing marginal costs and benefits of an outsourcing arrangement.
For a model like this to be a helpful decision support tool, it is necessary for it to be cross-functional and
account for marginal increases in such things as administrative expense, travel and information technology.
The model should also account for local economic factors such as exchange rates, labor rates and local
productivity indices. Wage rates, taxes, and overhead savings require careful consideration. Wage rates must
be adjusted for productivity to make meaningful comparisons. Overhead savings may only be a mirage. It is
often necessary to go to great lengths to ensure that for all reductions in plants and equipment that the plants
and equipment are actually reduced and not just shifted through the accounting books.
Finally, as we run through different scenarios, we vary some of the key assumptions in a reasonably random
manner to gain an understanding of the sensitivities of the final answer to the input variables. In the model
discussed in Appendix A, a Monte Carlo simulation was run by varying some of the key input variables at
random. The model then computes the sensitivity of the cost difference to changes in each variable. These
sensitivities can then be used to understand the magnitude and nature of the risks associated with each
outsourcing option. For example, some options might be highly sensitive to currency fluctuations while
others might be much more sensitive to the variation in labor rates. This type of analysis allows for a more
sophisticated answer than a break-even analysis or a static unit cost analysis can provide.
4.9 IDENTIFY KEY GOALS AND METRICS
The sensitivity output from the model should serve as a guide to create key goals and metrics for the
outsourcing relationship. The key decision variables with high sensitivities that are actionable should be
transformed into operational goals. The key decision variables that are external can be transformed into
metrics that should be monitored on an ongoing basis.
Actionable variables are the things that can be directly affected by operations. These variables include things
such as inventory turns, yields and productivity. In many cases, the exact variable used in the model may not
be readily available to the front line managers. In these cases, simply choose a proxy that is highly correlated
with the model variable. For example, the model uses final rolled yield. This may not be available or it may
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seem less relevant to a person working in SMT. Here we would clearly substitute first pass yield for the
operation without changing the measurement significantly.
External variables are those things that are not directly affected by the actions of management. Such things
as exchange rates, tax rates and shipping rates are external to the control of management. Nonetheless, often
these variables are incredibly important in determining profitability and should be monitored. If your model
predicts that an external variable has a large impact on the return, establish a process where that variable is
reviewed from time to time to see if there are any trends that management should be concerned about.
Lastly, use these variables to develop a life cycle plan for the outsourcing relationship. Determine in advance
what criteria will be used for deciding when to end the relationship. In addition, develop a plan on how the
relationship will end. In most cases, companies develop plans for beginning these relationships and never
develop a plan to end them. Developing a clear transition plan up front can avert tactical errors later.
4.10 EXECUTE THE PLAN AND TRACK PERFORMANCE
The final step in the framework is to execute the plan and to track performance against the predetermined
goals. Executing such a plan requires a well-defined process for identifying issues and tracking them to their
resolution. There are commercially available software packages for managing these tasks. But in the end, a
motivated and persistent person with a pencil and paper can be just as effective. The main goal should be to
identify the root cause of the issue and religiously update the processes. This is the method by which
organizational learning takes place and critical capabilities are built.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
The use of contract manufacturing services is growing at a staggering rate. In fact, J. Keith Dunne, Managing
Director at Robertson Stephens in San Francisco said recently "It's the only sector that's growing as fast as
the Internet, plus it has proven profit potential." Just as the Internet elevated the importance of information
technology from an administrative support function to a strategic weapon, the use of contract manufacturing
services could soon transform the nature of outsourcing decisions from a simple procurement activity to a
means of strategically allocating company resources, building critical capabilities, and aligning organizational
incentives.
Even with this explosive growth in the use of contract manufacturers, many companies still tend to treat
outsourcing decisions in a tactical way. These decisions are often made solely within the manufacturing
organization. As such, the people charged with making these decisions often lack the strategic perspective
necessary to ensure coherence with overall company strategy. As a consequence of this, these decisions often
focus too heavily on things that can be easily quantified and compared such as labor rates, capital
expenditure, and tax rates. While these issues are important, they only represent a part of the total picture
that must be considered if outsourcing is to be used to gain a strategic advantage.
Manufacturing outsourcing decisions are inherently cross-functional, cross-organizational, difficult decisions
with significant strategic consequences. These decisions are deeply intertwined with product, process and
supply chain structure. Product design decisions affecting product modularity and interdependence can have
large effects on both the complexity of the supply chain and on the types of solutions that can be delivered to
the end customer. Likewise, outsourcing a particular function could alter the information flows between
functional groups and inhibit the firm's ability to build and sustain its critical capabilities. A decision to
outsource manufacturing can have a lasting impact on a company's ability to compete.
The model presented in this paper allows a firm to consider these strategic issues. The model accomplishes
this by providing a framework for the analysis of the many non-quantitative aspects of an outsourcing
decision. Such issues as market positioning, critical capability development and gaps and opportunities
analysis are captured and integrated into a coherent picture of the extended organization. This picture is then
used to determine which form of outsourcing, if any, is most appropriate to fulfilling the long-term mission
of the firm. By providing this perspective, use of the model ensures that a decision to outsource is consistent
with the overall strategic and organizational objectives of the firm as a whole.
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Once the coherence of the outsourcing decision with the overall company strategy has been established, the
tactical piece of the problem remains to be solved. This paper also presents a quantitative cost model for
evaluating different outsourcing options and making the tactical decisions of which EMS provider to use and
which location is best. The quantitative model presented in Appendix A provides a means for capturing the
direct, indirect, and supply chain cost of a given outsourcing relationship. Direct costs are acquired through
the completion of simple worksheets containing information on labor costs, depreciation, headcount and
material costs. Indirect costs such as additional information technology expenditures and additional travel are
captured through a similar worksheet. The supply chain component of the cost model calculates both the
capital-related costs of inventory and the revaluation exposure created by holding inventory while material
prices are declining. These three cost areas are then integrated into a single 'dashboard' that presents a
summary comparison between outsourced production and in-house production.
As with any models like the ones presented here, implementation is critical if the benefits identified in these
models are to be achieved. Moreover, the models presented here are not intended to be used as cookbook
solutions that can be followed blindly. Instead, these models were created with three goals in mind: First, the
models are intended to share the outsourcing learning from the Qualcomm experience. Second, the models
were created to provide a common language and approach for discussing outsourcing as an organization
begins the decision process. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the models created here are meant to
serve as a baseline for other organizations as they learn more about how manufacturing outsourcing can
enhance their competitiveness.
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APPENDIX A: OUTSOURCING COST MODEL
APPENDIX A.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
The outsourcing cost model (OCM) provides the quantitative piece of the analysis of an outsourcing decision.
It is intended to be use in two different modes. First, it is designed to be useful in the evaluation stage of the
decision for comparing different outsourcing alternatives such as location, contractor, or even to outsource at
all. Second, it can be used after the decision to outsource is made to track performance of the contractor and
to aid in ongoing negotiations about contract pricing. At Qualcomm, the financial terms of the arrangement
between Qualcomm and the contractor were renegotiated each quarter. The cost model provides a means to
make cost comparisons using a common language and a common definition of the different cost categories.
At Qualcomm, this model is used to compare in-house production costs to outsourced production costs and
evaluate the sources of these differences. In addition, in-house production costs are used to produce a
projection of the costs of the contractor. These projected costs are then compared to the costs actually
negotiated with the contractor. Differences here could represent either money left on the table during the
negotiations or areas where improvements are possible either internally or at the contractor.
The model is broken into four main parts: the SMT (surface mount technology) cost model, the FAT (final
assembly & test) cost model, the supply chain cost model and the model summary page. Because Qualcomm
chose to outsource both by function and by volume in-house and external production were modeled for both
SMT and FAT. The supply chain cost model captured the pipeline costs associated with having extra
amounts of inventory in transit and storage at multiple sites. The model summary page rolls all of these
values up into a "dashboard" of where the major costs are in the system and presents the key comparisons.
The model was created in Microsoft Excel. A softcopy of the model (with Qualcomm Proprietary data
removed) can be obtained from the author.
APPENDIX A.2 THE SMT AND FAT COST MODELS
The SMT and FAT cost models begin with an input worksheet that must be completed for both the in-house
production and the outsourced production. This worksheet captures such things as capacity, yields, labor
rates, headcounts, etc. Usually, the in-house numbers are easy to find. The numbers for the contractor can
either be provided by the contractor or they can be estimated by taking the costs of the in-house production
and adding the "uplifts", or profits, charged by the contractor, adding any additional freight and shipping
costs, and then adjusting the labor rates and headcounts in both locations. Below is an example of both a
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completed SMT and FAT worksheet with the defiitions of each line item to the right side. Note that the
structure of the FAT worksheet looks almost identical to the one for SMT.
SMT Cost Worksheet
Line item Value Notes
Capacity:
Monthly Capacity/line
(units/month/line)
Yield (%)
Number of SMT Lines
Conversion
Labor:
DL Headcount/Line
(people/line)
Direct Labor (loaded) ($/hr.)
IL Headcount/Line
(people/line)
Indirect Labor (loaded) ($/hr.)
Overhead:
Depreciation ($/Line/Month)
Facility-Utility-Op. Supply
($/month/line)
SG&A ($/month)
QA/Mat'l Handling/Planning
OH ($/month)
Conversion Profit (% of
Conversion Cost)
Materials:
Turnkey Material Costs
($/board)
Turnkey Material COA (% of
Turnkey Cost)
QC Sourced Material Costs
($/board)
QC Sourced Material COA (%
of QC Mat'l Cost)
Material Profit (%of total Mat'l)
Scrap Costs (% of Total
Material Costs)
Volume (Demand):
Volume (units/month)
Inventory:
Raw Material (days)
Work in Progress (days)
Finished Goods/In Transit
(days)
90,000 This is the rated capacity of a single line.
95T This is the effective yield of a line (actual output/rated capacity)
2 The number of SMT lines dedicated to solely to Qualcomm.
22 The number of Direct Labor people (people in direct contact
with product) per line.
$00 This is the average completely loaded labor rate for direct labor.
0 The number of Indirect Labor people (people NOT in direct
contact with product, yet scale with lines) per line.
$30.00 This is the average completely loaded labor rate for indirect
labor.
$200,000
$70,000
$22,000
$22,000
15.00%
This is the depreciation of the SMT equipment. Do NOT include
depreciation that is charged to QC directly.
This is the depreciation for the facilities and the charge for
operating supplies (expendables).
Sales General and Administrative. Note that this is NOT $/line.
It is $/month and will be amortized over all lines.
Note that this is NOT $/month/ine. It is $/month and is
therefore amortized over all lines.
This is the profit charged against all conversion costs
(Depreciation, Labor, Facilites, Operating Supplies).
$40.00 |The average BOM cost of the tumkey material.
1.98%
$70.00
0.8%
0.8%
0.5%
The percent charged for Cost of Acquisition to the Tunrkey
Material Costs.
The average BOM cost of the Qualcomm supplied material.
The percent charged for Cost of Acquisition to the QOC Sourced
Material Costs.
Percent profit charged to the total Material costs including
materials and COA.
This is the material scrap rate.
350,000 |This is the average number of units per month.
15 Days of raw material on hand.
7 Days of work-in-progress material on hand.
5 Days of finished goods and in-transit material.
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Shipping/Freight:
Packing Material Cost ($/unit)
Component Freight Costs
($/unit)
CCA Freight Costs ($/unit)
$0.08 Packing material costs for shipping a CcA ($/unit).
$1.40 Inbound freight costs including freight, duty, and broker fees
($/unit).
$0.25 Outbound freight costs including freight, duty, and broker fees
($/unit).
Other:
Net 30 Terms (% of Total 0.350% Percent charged to the total costs for net 30 days terms. This is
Costs) a negotiated value.
Depreciation Charged back to $10,000 This is the Depreciation charged to Qualcomm for Qualcomm-
Qualcomm ($/month) specific equipment (associated with SMT).
Figure 8: Example SMT Cost Worksheet. (numbers disguised)
FAT Cost Worksheet
Line item Value Notes
Capacity:
Monthly Capacity/line
(units/month/line)
Yield (%)
Number of SMT Lines
Conversion
Labor:
DL Headcount/Line
(people/line)
Direct Labor (loaded) ($/hr.)
IL Headcount/Line
(people/line)
Indirect Labor (loaded) ($/hr.)
Overhead:
Depreciation ($/Line/Month)
Facility-Utility-Op. Supply
($/month/line)
SG&A ($/month)
QA/Mat'I Handling/Planning
OH ($/month)
Conversion Profit (% of
Conversion Cost)
Materials:
Turnkey Material Costs
($/board)
Turnkey Material COA (% of
Turnkey Cost)
QC Sourced Material Costs
($/board)
QC Sourced Material COA (%
of QC Mat'l Cost)
Material Profit (%of total Mat'l)
Scrap Costs (% of Total
90,000 This is the rated capacity of a single line.
95% This is the effective yield of a line (actual output/rated capacity)
1 The number of SMT lines dedicated to solely to Qualcomm.
15 The number of Direct Labor people (people in direct contact
with product) per line.
$15.00 This is the average completely loaded labor rate for direct labor.
4 The number of Indirect Labor people (people NOT in direct
contact with product, yet scale with lines) per line.
$30.00 This is the average completely loaded labor rate for indirect
labor.
$90,000
$10,000
$5,000
$10,000
15.00%
This is the depreciation of the SMT equipment. Do NOT include
depreciation that is charged to QC directly.
This is the depreciation for the facilities and the charge for
operating supplies (expendables).
Sales General and Administrative. Note that this is NOT $/line.
It is $/month and will be amortized over all lines.
Note that this is NOT $/month/line. It is $/month and is
therefore amortized over all lines.
This is the profit charged against all conversion costs
(Depreciation, Labor, Facilites, Operating Supplies).
$5.00 IThe average BOM cost of the turnkey material.
3.0% The percent charged for Cost of Acquisition to the Tunrkey
Material Costs.
$9.00 IThe average BOM cost of the Qualcomm supplied material.
0.8%
0.8%
0.5%
The percent charged for Cost of Acquisition to the QC Sourced
Material Costs.
Percent profit charged to the total Material costs including
materials and COA.
This is the material scrap rate.
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Material Costs)
Volume (Demand):
Volume (units/month)
Inventory:
Raw Material (days)
Work in Progress (days)
Finished Goods/In Transit
(days)
Shipping/Freight:
Packing Material Cost ($/unit)
Component Freight Costs
($/unit)
Phone Freight Costs ($/unit)
Other:
Net 30 Terms (% of Total
Costs)
Depreciation Charged back to
Qualcomm ($/month)
| -7|
260,000 This is the average number of units per month.
20 Days of raw material on hand.
4 Days of work-in-progress material on hand.
4 Days of finished goods and in-transit material.
$1 Packing material costs for shipping a phone ($/unit).
$0.34 Inbound freight costs including freight, duty, and broker fees($/unit).
$0.28 Outbound freight costs including freight, duty, and broker fees
1($/unit).
0.350% Percent charged to the total costs for net 30 days terms. This is
a negotiated value.
$400,000 This is the Depreciation charged to Qualcomm for Qualcomm-
specific equipment (associated with FAT).
Figure 9: Example FAT Cost Worksheet. (numbers disguised)
The example above has the terms defined that are specific to the Qualcomm-Solectron relationship. It is not
necessary to understand each of these specific definitions. For a different relationship in a different industry,
these will certainly not be the same. The main goals of producing these worksheets are that they provide a
common language for comparison purposes and that they provide the basic data for the other parts of the
cost model.
Once the results of these worksheets are entered into the model, the model then does the mostly basic
calculations to reach a unit cost comparison and a total cost comparison. In addition, the model produces a
Pareto diagram of the major contributors to cost both for in-house and outsourced production. This plot
allows those managing the direct cost structure to focus improvement efforts on larger cost contributors first.
An example of the unit cost breakdown output of the model is shown below.
Output
Total Capacity:
Demanded Volume:
Yield Adjusted Capacity:
Output:
Conversion
In-house Outsourced
Monthly % of $/Board Monthly % of $/Board
Total Total
390,000
284,333
370,500
284,333
360,000
366,000
342,000
342,000
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Labor
Direct Labor:
Indirect Labor:
Labor Total:
Overhead
Depreciation:
Faciltity/Utility/Op
Supply:
SG&A:
QA/Mat'l
Handlinq/Planning:
Total Overhead:
Profit on Conversion:
Total Conversion:
Materials:
Turnkey Material Costs:
Turnkey Material COA:
QC Sourced Material
Costs:
QC Sourced Material
COA:
Scrap Costs:
Material Profit:
Total Material Costs:
Shipping/Freight:
Packing Material Cost:
Component Freight
Costs:
CCA Freight Costs:
Total Shipping/Freight:
Other:
Fixture Shipments:
Net 30 Terms:
Total Other:
$923,227 3.38%
$170,957 0.63%
$1,094,184
$3.25
$0.60
4.01% $3.85
$672,672 2.46% $2.37
$285,012 1.04% $1.00
$0
$94,360
0.00% $0
0.35% $0.33
$1,052,044 3.85% $3.70
$0 0.00% $0
$2,146,228 7.86% $7.55
$24,896,197
$0
$
91.13%
0.00%
0.00%
$87.56
$0
$0
$ 0.00% $0
$124,481 0.46% $0.44
$0 0.00% $0
$25,020,678 91.58%
$0 0.00%
$153,540 0.56%
$0 0.00%
$153,540
$0
$0
$88.00
$0
$0.54
$0
0.56% $0.54
0.00% $0
0.00% $0
$0 0.00% $0
$250,041 0.78% $0.73
$102,305 0.32% $0.30
$352,346 1.10% $1.03
$574,389 1.80% $1.68
$285,012 0.89% $0.83
$24,640 0.08% $0.07
$25,704 0.08% $0.08
$909,745 2.85% $2.66
$174,800
$1,436,890
$12,134,160
$240,256
$17,007,660
0.55% $0.51
4.50% $4.20
37.98%
0.75%
53.24%
$35.48
$0.70
$49.73
$141,164 0.44% $0.41
$147,616 0.46% $0.43
$242,090.57 0.76% $0.71
$29,912,947
$27,360
$362,520
93.63% $87.46
0.09% $0.08
1.13% $1.40
$95,760 0.30%
$485,640
$0
$111,424.17
$111,424
$0.28
1.52% $1.42
0.00% $0
0.35% $0.33
0.35% $0.33
ITotal: $27,320,446 100.00% $96.09 $31,946,901 100.00% $93.41
Figure 10: Unit Cost Comparison Model Output (number disguised)
APPENDIX A.3 THE INVENTORY PIPELINE COSTS MODEL
The inventory pipeline cost model takes the inventory and volume data from the worksheets above and the
cost outputs of the SMT and FAT models and uses them to produce a picture of the supply chain costs of an
outsourcing arrangement. The model analyzes supply costs in two areas: costs of working capital (inventory)
in the pipeline and the inventory revaluation exposure created by time delays in the system. The key assumed
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parameters for this model are taken from the general assumptions worksheet and the inventory sections of
the SMT and FAT worksheets. Here the user inputs the following key parameters for this analysis.
Supply Chain Assumptions Value Notes
Qualcomm Cost of Capital 15.0% Appropriate discount rate for capital.
Current ASP $180 Current Actual Selling Price (ASP) for this
product.
% Avg. ASP Decrease per Quarter 6.0% Average percent decrease in ASP per
quarter.
% Avg. Material Cost Decrease Per Quarter 5.0% Average percent material cost decrease per
quarter.
Figure 11: Supply Chain Assumptions Input from General Assumptions Page (numbers disguised)
The inventory pipeline model uses these values along with values such as unit price and volume from other
models to calculate the costs of working capital and the inventory revaluation exposure due to material price
decreases while material is in the pipeline. An example of this output is below.
In-house Outsourced
Cost of Capital Related
Total "Cost" "Cost"/ Total "Cost" "Cost"/
unit unit
SMT
Raw Material $16MM $195k $0.70 $19MM $233k $0.65
Work-In-Progess $3MM $42k $0.15 $4MM $49k $0.14
Finished Goods/In-Transit $ - $ - $ - $4MM $49k $0.14
FAT
Raw Material $824k $9k $0.02 $2MM $27k $0.11
Work-In-Progess $5MM $59k $0.15 $3MM $41k $0.16
Finished Goods/In-Transit $ - $ - $ - $5MM $64k $0.25
TOTAL $26MM $307k $39MM $466k
Inventory Revaluation Exposure
SMT
Raw Material $16MM 273k $0.96 $19MM 326k $0.89
Work-In-Progess $3MM 54k $0.19 $3k 65k $0.18
Finished Goods/In-Transit $ - $ - $ - $3MM 65k $0.18
FAT
Raw Material $824k 13k $0.03 $2MM 38k $0.15
Work-in-Progess $4MM 76k $0.20 $4MM 81k $0.31
Finished Goods/In-Transit $ - $ - $ - $4MM 81k $0.31
TOTAL $25MM $418k $40MM $658k
Figure 12: Pipeline Cost Model Output Page Example (numbers disguised)
This part of the model captures the costs that are not often captured by traditional accounting methods. The
inventory revaluation exposure is the amount that the inventory in the pipeline decays in value before it is
sold. The higher the number of days of inventory and the faster input prices are declining the higher the
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inventory revaluation exposure. Depending on how the outsourcing relationship is structured, the inventory
pipeline can be shortened or lengthened. This model captures and attempts to quantify the cost or benefit
associated with this. The inventory pipeline cost model also calculates the working capital related costs of the
inventory pipeline. This simply takes the dollar amount of inventory in the system and computes the cost
associated with that amount of working capital.
APPENDIX A.4 THE MODEL SUMMARY PAGE
The outsourcing cost summary page presents the dashboard view of the outsourcing relationship. This view
gathers input from all of the sub-models (SMT, FAT, Supply Chain) and then subtracts out the outsourcing
specific costs like the outsourcing specific team, extra IT related costs or extra travel that are entered on the
general assumptions page. This page provides the data for making the primary comparisons that this model is
designed to do: compare in-house production to the negotiated price with the contractor and compare the
negotiated price with the contractor to the model projected price for the contractor. In the example that is
given, the contractor is Solectron in Guadalajara Mexico.
OutSourcing Cost Summary
Direct Costs
Total Monthly OS Overhead:
Outsourcing Specific Team:
Additional Travel:
Additional Other:
Total Monthly SMT Savings (Costs):
Unit Savings:
OutSourced Volume:
Total Monthly FAT Savings (Costs):
Unit Savings:
OutSourced Volume:
Net Monthly Savings (Costs):
In-house Model
vS.
Negotiated Price
$ (199,000)
$ (180,000)
$ (19,000)
$0
$1,136,829
$3.11
366,000
$ (308,595)
$(1.19)
260,000
$629,234
Guadalajara Model
vS.
Negotiated Price
$(199,000)
$(180,000)
$(19,000)
$0
$ (163,971)
$(0.45)
366,000
$ (423,283)
$ (1.63)
260,000
$ (786,255)
Supply Chain Costs
Monthly Inventory Cost of Capital:
Inventory Turnover Estimate
In-house
$307,026
1.10
Guadalajara
$466,544
0.92
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Monthly Inventory Revaluation: $418,066 $658,995
Total Supply Chain: $725,093 $1,125,540
Figure 13: Example of the Model Summary Page (numbers disguised)
The column of numbers on the left represents the comparison between in-house production and the
negotiated prices for outsourced production. This gives the manager a view of how much (if any) money is
being saved by outsourcing. The right column represents the projected costs of the contractor and the actual
negotiated costs with the contractor. Comparing a reasonable cost projection for the contractor with the
actual price negotiated has several benefits. First, we can identify areas to focus on in the negotiations and
thereby make them more efficient. Second, we can identify areas where improvements can be made either
internally or within the contractor. Finally, comparing cost items in this ways instills a common language for
discussing costs.
APPENDIX A.5 SENSITIVITY MODELING
In Chapter 4, it was recommended that we perform some sort of variation analysis on the quantitative model
to determine key variables. The outsourcing cost model achieves this by using the Excel add-in Crystal Ball
to run a Monte-Carlo simulation on the model. Crystal Ball allows a user to specify certain cells as
'assumption' cells and others as 'forecast' cells. Assumption cells are values in the spreadsheet that have some
underlying distribution. Essentially, when a cell is made into an assumption cell, a random variable is created.
Forecast cells are the outputs of the model and are generally some function of the assumption cells and
possibly other cells. Forecast cells simply record the distribution of their values during the simulation so that
they can be displayed later. Once all of the forecast cells and the assumption cells have been defined, the
simulation is run. During the simulation, values are selected for the assumption cells randomly given the
distribution that was assigned. The effects of these changes are then propagated through the model and the
values of the forecast cells are stored. This process is repeated many times until the maximum number of
trials is reached.
For the outsourcing cost model at Qualcomm, we chose to allow some of the more volatile assumptions to
vary and to view the result that this had on the final unit-cost difference between outsourced (Guadalajara)
production and in-house production. All variables are assumed to have a normal distribution around the
mean within the range specified. Clearly, some variables do not vary completely independently of others.
For example, it is doubtful that the indirect labor rates and the direct labor rates in one location will vary
independently of one another. It is more likely that these two variables will be positively correlated with each
other. To compensate for this in the simulation, we chose to insert a correlation factor into the assumption
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cell parameters. For variables that are positively correlated, we assumed a correlation of 0.9. Likewise, for
variables that were likely to be negatively correlated, we chose a correlation factor of -0.9. Examples of the
assumption variables and their assumed distributions are given below.
Standard
Variable Mean Dev. Range Correlated with:
In-House Yield 95% 5% 70%-99% Contractor Yield (0.9)
Contractor Yield 95% 5% 70%-99% In-House Yield (0.9)
In-House Direct Labor Rate $15.00 $1.50 - In-House Indirect Labor Rate
(0.9)
Contractor Direct Labor Rate $5.00 $0.50 - Contractor Indirect Labor Rate
(0.9)
In-House Indirect Labor Rate $25.00 $2.50 - In-House Direct Labor Rate
(0.9)
Contractor Indirect Labor Rate $15.00 $1.50 - Contractor Direct Labor Rate
(0.9)
In-House Demand Volume 285,000 28,500 -
Contractor Demand Volume 366,000 36,600 -
Contractor Component Freight $1.06 $0.11 -
In-House Component Freight $0.54 $0.05 -
Figure 14: Example of Assumption Cell Parameters for Crystal Ball Simulation (numbers disguised)
Once the assumption cells are set up correctly, the simulation is run. The simulation produces two important
outputs. First, the simulation
Forecast: Unit Cost Difference
outputs the distribution of the 10,000 Trials Frequency Chart 25 Outliers
unit cost difference between in- 02273
house and outsourced production
(the forecast cell). If we have
accurately captured the major
sources of volatility in our C..o .0
assumptions, this distribution will .ooo 0
. . ($3.50) $2.50) ($1.50) ($0.50) $0.50
show how likely it is that we are F,
saving money on a unit cost basis. F~gure 15: Example of the Forecast Cell Plot for Unit Cost Difference
A sample of this plot is shown in
Figure 15. Second, the simulation will output a plot showing the correlations between the different
assumption variables and the unit cost difference between outsourced and in-house production. The
magnitude of the correlation reflects each variable's overall importance to the forecasted unit cost difference.
A sample of the correlation output is also given below in Figure 16.
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Sensitivity Chart
Target Forecast: Unit Cost Difference
GDLRate
G ILRate
VDLRate
VIlLRate
V Capacity
VFPY
GMaterialProfit
G_TumkeyProfit
V tLHeadcount
GCapacity
GQCSourcedProfit
VTurnkeyMaterial
V DLHeadcount/Une
GVolume
VFaciltiy/UtilJQ>.
G FPY
VVolume
GDLHeadcount/Line
GFaci Itiy/U~ti IJOp.
GOCSourcedMaterial
VA/MFVPlanning
GCCAFreight
G tLHeadcount
G_-Depreciation
GNet30Teris
VComiponentFreight
VDepreciation
GPackingMaterial
GComponentFreight
GLaborProfit
GQ/CM-VPlanning
GTumkey-Material
* - Correlated assumption
.56
.54
-.48
-.46
.21
.19
.13
.12
-.10
.10
.09
-.09
-.08
-.07
-.06
.06
-.05
-.04
.04
.03
-.02
-.02
.02
.02
-.02
.02
-.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.00
Figure 16: Example of the sensitivity output from the Crystall Ball simulation. (numbers disguised)
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-1 -0.5 0
Measured by Rar* Correlation
0.5
.09 * U
-.09 * U
-.04 I
* I
* I
* I
* I
* I
* I
* I
* I
* I
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